tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post8379617664253589538..comments2023-09-24T08:22:14.199+01:00Comments on Joseph Shaw's Philosophy Blog: Absolute prohibitionsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-42480076752712125432007-03-10T09:35:00.000+00:002007-03-10T09:35:00.000+00:00Aquinas wouldn't say that 'don't cause disproporti...Aquinas wouldn't say that 'don't cause disproportionate harm' could be an act-description, because acts are specified by their intentions (or perhaps by their objects or ends). But for modern purposes I take the point.<BR/><BR/>Reference for Abraham and Isaac: ST Ia IIae Q.94 a. 5, objection 2 and its reply.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-87735800444198319902007-01-10T18:40:00.000+00:002007-01-10T18:40:00.000+00:00The reference for this:
Aquinas explains the Sacri...The reference for this:<br />Aquinas explains the Sacrifice of Abraham (and God intending harm to humans) by saying that humans are never innocent, in relation to God.Daniel Hillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07823511443088751096noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-14863250969661210632007-01-10T13:31:00.000+00:002007-01-10T13:31:00.000+00:00Reference for what?Reference for what?Joseph Shawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01082798656205665691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-39372762072632352432007-01-10T12:13:00.000+00:002007-01-10T12:13:00.000+00:00Thanks for this, Joseph. Could you give me the Aqu...Thanks for this, Joseph. Could you give me the Aquinas reference, please?<br /><br />Yes, I think we should take 'causing disproportionate harm' as an act-description: that way allows us the benefit of an absolute prohibition (modulo my previous reservations).Daniel Hillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07823511443088751096noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-43100604710349058532007-01-09T23:48:00.000+00:002007-01-09T23:48:00.000+00:00'Do not intend harm': that's a simplification, adm...'Do not intend harm': that's a simplification, admittedly. One can certainly intend harm to the non-innocent. Aquinas explains the Sacrifice of Abraham (and God intending harm to humans) by saying that humans are never innocent, in relation to God: all being under sentence of natural death on account of Original Sin.<br /><br />Another exception is 'for the benefit of the victim': cutting through healthy skin is a harm, even if it is to get at a burst appendix.<br /><br />So I agree with you, Daniel: I don't want to bring in double effect to explain away all the harms inflicted in medicine, punishment and warfare.<br /><br />'Don't cause disproportionate harm' is absolute? Well, in a sense it is, but it is a prohibition against harms over a certain threshold, not against actions of a certain descriptioin: unless 'causing disprortionate harm' is taken as the action-description (which is could be, I suppose).Joseph Shawhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01082798656205665691noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-64295061280520624422007-01-09T20:11:00.000+00:002007-01-09T20:11:00.000+00:00(1) 'murder, apostasy, and one or two other things...(1) 'murder, apostasy, and one or two other things (I think)' -- the list is actually 'murder, adultery, and idolatry'.<br />(2) 'there is just one absolute prohibition in Catholic ethics: do not intend harm'<br />(a) I wonder whether this is really absolute. May one not in warfare or self-defence or judicial punishment intend harm? Indeed, may one not intend small harms (e.g. cuts and bruises) in order to prevent large harms?<br />(b) I wonder whether this is really the only absolute prohibition. Does idolatry necessarily involve the intention to do harm? The tradition has it (wrongly, I think) that God cannot be harmed, and so there'd be an argument from tradition that one cannot intend to harm God since anyone able to form that intention would realize its impossibility and therefore not intend it. Does the committing of adultery necessarily involve the intention of harm?<br />(3) 'And one non-absolute restriction: do not cause foreseen and disproportionate harm'<br />I wonder whether this is really non-absolute. If one knows that the harm is disproportionate surely there is an absolute ban on causing it?<br />(4) God can, of course, intend harm.<br />(5) Is deception a harm? If so, that would have an interesting bearing on the question of lying: if one told a known falsehood without intention to deceive that would probably be justifiable, but if one intended to deceive that would not be justifiable. I fear, however, that such things as camouflage, disguise, leaving lights on to deter burglars (see a previous post), would all then be ruled out as attempts to deceive, even though the tradition is, I think, inclined to rule them in.Daniel Hillhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07823511443088751096noreply@blogger.com