tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post4959342430118433079..comments2023-09-24T08:22:14.199+01:00Comments on Joseph Shaw's Philosophy Blog: Another Prussic problemUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-23464410764996802342011-06-15T21:19:42.896+01:002011-06-15T21:19:42.896+01:00The trouble with example 2 is that it is unrealist...The trouble with example 2 is that it is unrealistic (I appreciate that this is not necessarily a proper objection to a philosophical example, but hear me out!). If we take it at face value, I say that Jill is completely in the wrong, for various reasons:<br />1). She fails in prudence. Blackmailers frequently lie. She can have little certainty that he will in fact do what he threatens, or even that he has the power to do it if he wants. Or that he will not do it anyway. Or even if he lives up to his side of the bargain, that he will not repeat the same crime whenever he next needs money. <br />2) She fails in justice. Justice requires resisting Benny's threat, and restraining him (or attempting to). It forbids killing an innocent person, even if that saves the lives of others.<br />3). She fails in charity - in believing, of Benny, that he would do anything so awful as what he threatens. <br />4) She fails again in prudence by believing (or telling herself or us that she believes) that her motive in pulling the trigger is finger-exercise. It clearly isn't. She intends (what she considers) a good result by illicit means. (The idea that exercise of any kind is a moral good is dubious in any case ).<br />No doubt most of these objections can be removed by adjusting the example. But perhaps it illustrates one reason why we need fixed moral rules: which is, we don't know the future. Too often in fables (maybe sometimes also in history) a consequence is feared, a wrong is done to avoid it, and the wrong itself brings about the feared consequence.Tim Robertsnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-59776920512834596082011-06-12T08:54:42.863+01:002011-06-12T08:54:42.863+01:001. In the first case, there is no certainty of any...1. In the first case, there is no certainty of any evil effect, whether direct or indirect.<br /><br />2. In the second case, there is certainty of direct evil effect. Even if there is a foreseeable good effect, it is not morally permissible ever to commit an evil that good may come of it.Nicolehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09653981297229201192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-26959748071123864332011-03-20T15:52:39.420+00:002011-03-20T15:52:39.420+00:00Last paragraph should have read differently.
&quo...Last paragraph should have read differently.<br /><br />"The question being raised with scenario TWO is not to do with acceptable levels of risked death which all individuals can have a view on and can freely assent or dissent to, but with acceptable levels of certain death which not all individuals have a say in."Alasdair Codonahttp://www.calumcille.com/salmaire.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-15187314988362836782011-03-20T11:24:05.952+00:002011-03-20T11:24:05.952+00:00I just can't find these situations comparable....I just can't find these situations comparable. The first relates to an aspect of human reality which is unrealistic to expect to avoid, ie, the creation of events which entail risk for yourself or for other individuals. The second relates to the creation of events which entail near certain consequences.<br /><br /> If you invite your adult friend to a concert and arrange to travel with him by train, there is a risk that you will both be injured or killed in a rail accident. Both individuals are free to agree or disagree with the action and either assent or dissent to participate in it. Your primary action of transporting is not aimed at killing your friend but at transporting both of you.<br /><br />If you and a friend are under constraint and you are told by an instigator to push a friend in the direct path of an oncoming train, or the instigator will push two other people in the path of the same train, it is certain that you will kill your friend if you push him. Your primary action of pushing is aimed at killing your friend. Both you and your friend may disagree with the action but only you have the choice to assent or dissent to act.<br /><br />In the first case, you and your adult friend both understand the degree of risk and accept it. In the second case, your friend understands the degree of certainty although he may or may not agree with the act being performed.<br /><br />People in cities constantly face risks (together and singly) by eating food (and getting poisoned), carrying bags (and being mugged), building roads and pavements (and getting run over in the street by a car), building pubs (and being attacked outside a pub), building planes (and dying in a plane crash) and so on. The creation of low risk situations is generally considered acceptable. It is unrealistic to assert that we can live as individuals in a world free from risk and its moral implications. What constitutes an acceptably low level can vary from society to society and, to different degrees, societies strive to find ways to minimise the risks. High risk scenarios, or scenarios of certain death, are not generally considered acceptable.<br /><br />The question with regard to scenario one is not, therefore, principally a question of the morality of taking a risk but of whether or not the situation is in practice involves acceptable or unacceptable degrees of risk.<br /><br />The question being raised with scenario one is not to do with acceptable levels of risked death which all individuals can have a view on and can freely assent or dissent to, but with acceptable levels of certain death which not all individuals have a say in.Alasdair Codonahttp://www.calumcille.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-6580317301894557752011-03-13T20:51:09.282+00:002011-03-13T20:51:09.282+00:00On further reflection, I don't actually know i...On further reflection, I don't actually know it's possible to fail to intend the life-saving aspects in Case 1, assuming one actually knows that the life-saving aspects are a reason in favor of the action.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-53196479937655497322011-03-12T20:13:27.950+00:002011-03-12T20:13:27.950+00:00Very interesting pair of cases!
1. I am not convi...Very interesting pair of cases!<br /><br />1. I am not convinced that the action in the first case is OK. My intuition is that there is a trivialization of harms in the first case unless the offsetting is intended. There are disproportionate harms in Case 1 in relation to the intended goods. Besides, the lives of different people are incommensurable in value and not to be thought of as canceling out. While the prudent agent will choose a course of action that results in fewer deaths, that still does not mean that there is such a thing as an aggregate on-balance harm (which in this case is supposedly non-existent).<br /><br />2. Take a simpler case. I know that if I scratch my itchy head, I'll save ten lives; if I don't, nothing will happen. I scratch my itchy head, with no intention to save ten lives. I think there is something wrong with my action. I have failed to intend what I should have intended. I could have, at no significant cost to anybody, done an act of love for the ten people. Instead, I failed to do so. That was wrong. (A related point. I think God has the attribute of omnirationality. One of the features of omnirationality is that an omnirational agent does actions on the basis of all the uncanceled reasons that favor the action. It is a failure of rationality to neglect an uncanceled reason that favors an action. And, like Kant and perhaps Aquinas, I do not distinguish between failures of rationality and failures of morality.)<br /><br />3. But I am worried about the butterfly effect as it affects my point. One thing that lessens the problem there is that we also have the butterfly effect in any alternative scenario. And we need to do something (if only lie still). It might also be that if we have <em>agapĂȘ</em>, we will have a "general willing" of all the unknown goods that result from our virtuous actions without intermediate evil causes. <br /><br />4. One can specify that Jill has no other way of exercising her trigger finger (the gun is pointed in a fixed direction, cannot be unloaded, and if she fails to shoot, she'll be shot, so that is her last chance to exercise her trigger finger in this life).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.com