tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post433356117749529343..comments2023-09-24T08:22:14.199+01:00Comments on Joseph Shaw's Philosophy Blog: Intending harms: some thoughtsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-20941489137737444292011-06-15T23:15:37.017+01:002011-06-15T23:15:37.017+01:00Dear Joseph:
I agree with your analysis. But if t...Dear Joseph:<br /><br />I agree with your analysis. But if this analysis is correct, how could you explain the common case used by the double effect tradition according to which it is licit for someone to put himself in the trajectory of a bullet (or an arrow, in the original example) that is directed towards the King or towards a friend? Do you think that the authors were mistaken in considering licit the act of the saver?<br /><br />This case is analogous, in its intentional structure, to the fat man case that is pushed into the rail of the trolley (we may suppose that the fat man puts himself in the rail, to save his children that are trapped in the rail).<br /><br />Sorry for my precarious English.<br /><br />Un saludo desde Chile,<br /><br />Alejandro Miranda M.Alejandrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01178622311135608950noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28278152.post-91579011700822148752011-03-03T13:13:51.044+00:002011-03-03T13:13:51.044+00:00Isn't it rather a (common and convenient) fict...Isn't it rather a (common and convenient) fiction to say we're intending harm in any of those cases, except for the last? <br /><br />Sure, we may be doing something seriously wrong in cases where we intend something that in fact constitutes harm for the victim (such as craniotomy/skull crushing, even though the permanency of the skull being crushed need not be intended: this is still a deliberate bodily invasion of a kind which does an innocent person no good but only lethal harm). <br /><br />In short, why make intention of harm do all the moral work, as opposed to intentions we clearly do have - to invade the body - coupled with morally conclusive side-effects (serious permanent harm and no good for the person invaded). Shouldn't we keep the phrase 'intention of harm' (if we're speaking precisely) for cases where harm is in fact among the goals we have? The invasion itself is one of our goals with craniotomy, but the permanent damage need not be. <br /><br />The agent may just dig his heels in and say, it's a simple psychological fact about me that I wasn't intending harm as such when I crushed the skull or (to give some other examples) gave my euthanasiast or simply grossly inept therapeutically-motivated injection which was immediately fatal. In fact, I was intending to benefit: that's what euthanasia (or alternatively, that's what inept medicine) is all about. (Of course, in the inept medicine case there is no foresight of lethal effects, so this is quite different morally from craniotomy or euthanasia; however, the intended bodily invasion does in fact constitute harm, unbeknownst to the doctor.) <br /><br />Interestingly, even in the case of intentionally killing an innocent person, where the killing itself is clearly intended, the person is probably not killed qua innocent person but qua obstacle to our progress, etc.Helen Watthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17086954734757237040noreply@blogger.com